On 14 June 2013, the last man foreign observers were expecting to
triumph won the 11th Iranian presidential election. On the first round, Hassan
Rouhani, a moderate cleric supported by Reformists, finished in first place
with 50,7% of the votes. In Tehran and in the other main Iranian cities, people
celebrated his victory in the street dancing, singing, some even calling for
the freedom of Moussavi and Karoubi, the former leaders of the Green Movement who
still remain under house arrest. The streets of Iran hadn’t seen so many people
since the deceptive re-election of M. Ahmadinejad in 2009. This time, however,
the Regime let them keep their votes. Hope replaced anger.
What can Iranians really expect from this election? Not much, in
fact. As with Khatami between 1997 and 2005, Iranians may face disappoitment
with their new president. Of course hope exists but the highest the
expectations, the strongest the disillusion. First of all, it is important to keep
in mind that Rouhani is not a true Reformist, even if Reformists supported him
in the elections. He is a Moderate, a centrist politician able to build bridges between the population’s expectations and the conservative Establishment.
But he is still a follower of the Islamic Republic. On this point, his victory
can be compared to a safety valve for the Regime, which does not take any risk.
Of course, Rouhani was not Khamenei’s first choice but he was the only
candidate who was able to satisfy the population’s need for change without threatening
the Regime’s foundations. Indeed, any change that would occur would be skin-deep, rather than deep. With Rouhani’s victory,
Khamenei lowers the pressure on the Regime by giving people a utopian hope. As
long as the current Supreme Leader stays in office, nothing will really change
in the Islamic Republic. Remember: the president is just the chief of the
executive. The Iranian institutional system has been conceived to merge all the
power in the hands of the Supreme Leader. If the latter does not accept a
government’s decision, he can simply cancel it without any further explanation.
As a regent waiting for the Messiah’s return, he has been appointed by God. Therefore
he cannot fail.
Regarding Rouhani’s score and the high turnout of this election
(more than 70%), it would have been too risky not to let him win. Of course he
has won just over 50% of the votes, and maybe if the conservative votes had not
been split, things would have been different. We can easily imagine that if
Ghalibaf had reached more than 30%, the temptation would have been strong for
the Regime to attempt a second round. However, without any conservative
candidate over 20%, it was not credible. In other words, Khamenei preferred a
centrist president without real power, one that would be able to cheat the
population on what they can really hope, instead of risking a new Green
Movement again.
In practice, the possible improvements are limited. Maybe Iranians
can expect less control by the morality police forces. The reformist press might
be less supressed, but that already occurred during Khatami’s presidency.
Another subject of concern is the economy issue, which is linked to
nuclear development. Indeed international sanctions compromise foreign
investments and international trade with the Islamic Republic. As Rouhani
promised during his campaign, a more conciliatory rhetoric on the nuclear issue
is to be expected. However, in reality the Iranian President does not have any
power to influence the nuclear program. It indeed stays in the hands of the
Supreme Leader and the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guardians Corps) who remain very
firm on this topic. Furthermore, Rouhani was very clear about the fact that there
would be no giving up the “civilian” and “lawful” nuclear ambitions of Iran. Nevertheless
he assured being ready to more open discussions than the Ahmadinejad
administration. This could be a joker for Khamenei. If Rouhani presents himself
as ready to reach an agreement with the P-5 Group, he might succeed in lifting
a part of the international sanctions that suffocate the Iranian economy. This
would already be an important success for Iran. But more than words, the
international community needs acts. If Rouhani were to fail despite his
open-minded rhetoric, his failure could be used by the Regime. Thus the latter
could argue that they tried to negotiate, but that in reality the members of
the P-5 Group (and specially the United States) were the ones who did not want
to reach an agreement. Once again the Islamic Republic would have the
opportunity to present itself as the martyr fighting against the injustice of
the “Great Satan”. In this scenario, the Regime would see its hard-line politics
legitimated.
In conclusion, it can be
pointed out that Rouhani’s election is not as bad as one would think for the
Regime, for several reasons:
- - While Rouhani remains a centrist politician and a follower of the Islamic Republic, his election also satisfies a population that does not recognize itself in the more conservative elements of the Iranian political life. Letting him be elected serves as a security system to decrease pressure on the Regime.
- - Rouhani does not dispose of enough power to change the system which he is part of. Therefore he does not represent a real threat for the Supreme Leader, who can still dismiss him at will. Furthermore, many important and non-elected institutions remain in the hands of the Conservatives, such as the Guardian Council that acts as a watchdog during elections.
- - With a turnout over 70%, this election is a success for the Islamic Republic. Thus the Regime sees its legitimacy increase, even if the hard-liners close to the Supreme Leader have been defeated.
- - Rouhani’s rhetoric could improve Iran’s perception around the world after eight years of aggressive statements by Ahmadinejad.
- - Concerning the nuclear issue, Rouhani’s election could only benefit the Regime. Either an agreement is reached, consequently lifting some sanctions, or Khamenei will see his hard-line position justified.
- - Regarding Israel warlike rhetoric, it will be more difficult to legitimize a military action against Iran if the new president keeps on proclaiming that he really wants to reach a diplomatic solution. Even if these are just words, Israeli hawks will find themselves in a difficult position to act freely without causing more damage Israel’s international image.
For all these reasons and given the rejection by the population of
the Ahmadinejad’s conservative politics, Rouhani could be Khamenei’s best
gamble to protect the Islamic Republic from its enemies. Just like a magician,
this trick could give the Regime the opportunity to bluff both the Iranians and
a part of the international community. In the short term this could protect the
Regime, but there is no doubt that in the long term the Islamic Republic will
have to reform itself if it wants to survive. Nevertheless, given the balance
of power between true Reformists and Conservatives, this scenario will not
happen tomorrow.
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